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Abstract A standard argument for one-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem is ‘Why
Ain’cha Rich?’, which emphasizes that one-boxers typically make a million dollars
compared to the thousand dollars that two-boxers can expect. A standard reply is the
‘opportunity defence’: the two-boxers who made a thousand never had an oppor-
tunity to make more. The paper argues that the opportunity defence is unavailable to
anyone who grants that in another case—a Frankfurt case—the agent is deprived of
opportunities in the way that advocates of Frankfurt cases typically claim.
Keywords Decision Theory  Newcomb’s Problem  Frankfurt cases  Free will
Causal Decision Theory (CDT) and Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) are two
leading theories of rational choice. Briefly and informally, CDT says that a rational
agent does whatever in her view most effectively brings about her ends. EDT says
that a rational agent does whatever in her view is the best evidence of what she
wants.1
CDT and EDT are both intuitive but not both true. They conflict over cases like:
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1 More formally (though still simplifying): let the probability function Cr and the news-value function V
respectively represent the agent’s credence (degree of belief) in, and desirability for, an arbitrary
proposition, propositions being subsets of the set W of possible worlds. Let O ¼ o1. . .onf g partition W
into propositions describing the agent’s options, and let Z ¼ z1. . .zmf g partition W into propositions that
each specify the outcome in as much detail as concerns the agent. Let some counterfactual-like operator
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Newcomb’s Problem. You must choose between (o1) taking only an opaque
box (‘one-boxing’) and (o2) taking both it and a transparent one in which
$1000 (k) is visible (‘two-boxing’). You get to keep what you take. The
opaque box already contains $1 M (m) if and only if (S1) a highly reliable
predictor foresaw your taking only it. If (S2) she foresaw your taking both
boxes then the opaque box is empty. So the payoff schedule (in dollars, for
which we assume linear increasing utility) is as follows (Table 1).
You can’t affect what is in the opaque box, this having been settled at the time of the
prediction. So taking both boxes causes you to be richer by k than if you had taken
only the opaque box. CDT therefore counts o2 as uniquely rational. But taking only
the opaque box is strong evidence that you get m, and taking both boxes is strong
evidence that you get k  m (since the predictor is very reliable). EDT therefore
counts o1 as uniquely rational. CDT and EDT disagree over Newcomb’s Problem.
Probably the most popular argument for one-boxing, and against CDT, is that
one-boxing maximizes expected return. Since the predictor reliably foresees both
one- and two-boxing, ‘one-boxers’ make on average just under m per trial, whereas
‘two-boxers’ make on average more than k but considerably less than m per trial. So
followers of EDT can ask followers of CDT: ‘If you’re so smart, why ain’cha rich?’
To this argument, known as ‘Why ain’cha rich?’ or WAR, defenders of CDT
have a simple reply. They say that its lower expected return has no bearing on the
rationality of two-boxing, because two-boxers typically lack money-making
opportunities that one-boxers typically enjoy. Most two-boxers face an opaque
box that never contained any money, and most one-boxers face an opaque box that
always contained $1 M. Call this the opportunity defence of CDT.2
This paper defends the following material conditional: if agents lack opportu-
nities in another case, a ‘Frankfurt case’, then the opportunity defence fails for a
version of Newcomb’s Problem that Sections 1–4 construct. For those who know
the Frankfurt cases, the argument is that Black’s role in the relevant Frankfurt cases
involves prediction in a way that makes those cases interpretable as Newcomb
problems. (For those who do not know the Frankfurt cases, Section 2 outlines the
relevant points.)
Table 1 Payoffs in Newcomb’s Problem
S1: predicted o1 S2: predicted o2
o1: take only opaque box m 0
o2: take both boxes mþ k k
Footnote 1 continued
where the U - and V -scores of an option o 2 O are U oð Þ ¼ P
z2Z
V zð ÞCr o[ zð Þ and V oð Þ ¼
P
z2Z
V zð ÞCr zjoð Þ respectively. For more sophisticated accounts see e.g. (Lewis 1981a; Joyce 1999 ch. 4, 5).
2 E.g. (Joyce 1999: 153; Wells 2017: 5).
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The conditional will prompt different people to draw different further conclu-
sions. Anyone who maintains its antecedent will agree that the opportunity defence
cannot blunt WAR. Anyone who maintains the opportunity defence will have to say
that certain opportunities are available in Frankfurt cases. But even someone who is
or becomes agnostic on both questions might find interest in the connection that the
conditional establishes between the debate over practical rationality on which
Newcomb’s problem bears, and the debate over free will on which Frankfurt cases
bear.
1. The construction starts with a base case, then modifies it in three steps. Before
describing the base case I’ll sketch the idea behind Frankfurt cases.
There is a debate over whether determinism is compatible with any kind of
freedom that entails moral responsibility. One argument that they are incompatible
turns on what Frankfurt called the:
Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). A person is responsible for doing
something only if he could have done otherwise.3
If PAP is true, and if determinism entails that anyone who has done something could
not have done otherwise, then determinism is incompatible with anyone’s being
morally responsible for what they did.
Frankfurt’s case against PAP involves examples where a person is morally
responsible for something that she could not have avoided doing. Such Frankfurt
cases originally took the following form.
Suppose someone – Black, let us say – wants Jones to perform a certain action.
Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to
avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones makes up his
mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an
excellent judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide to do something
other than what [Black] wants him to do. If it becomes clear that Jones is
going to decide something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that
Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what [Black] wants him to do.
Whatever Jones’s initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will have his
way… Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because Jones, for
reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black
wants him to perform… In this example there are sufficient conditions for
Jones’s performing the action in question. What action he performs is not up to
him… He has no alternative but to do what Black wants him to do. If he does
it on his own, however, his moral responsibility for doing it is not affected by
the fact that Black was lurking in the background with sinister intent, since
this intent never comes into play.4
Frankfurt holds that Jones was responsible for what he did even though he could not
have done otherwise. If so, PAP fails.
3 Frankfurt (1969): 167.
4 Frankfurt (1969): 173–4.
Frankfurt cases and the Newcomb Problem 3393
123
But arguably, the case only threatens both PAP and relevantly similar principles
if Black’s procedure meets certain constraints. After all, even if Jones can’t get
around doing what Black wants, he could still try or choose not to do it. Black
would then force his hand – but still, the fact that Jones could have thus tried or
chosen might suffice to make him responsible for his actual, wholehearted
performance.5 That may not save PAP itself: Jones still performs the act, is
responsible for doing so and has no alternative to performing it. But it does
immunize nearby principles, such as this variant of PAP: an agent is responsible for
a performance only if she could have acted blamelessly in the circumstances.6 That
principle seems well-placed to do what the incompatibilist wanted PAP to do.
In response, defenders of Frankfurt’s idea offer ‘prior sign’ cases where Black
can intervene before Jones chooses whether to do what Black wants, and so also
before he can try not to. Black can do this because he can observe some precursor of
Jones’s choice. This example concerns the 2008 US Presidential election.
Because he dares to hope that the Democrats finally have a good chance of
winning the White House, the benevolent but elderly neurosurgeon, Black, has
come out of retirement to participate in yet another philosophical example…
He has secretly inserted a chip in Jones’s brain that enables Black to monitor
and control Jones’s activities. Black can exercise this control through a
sophisticated computer that he has programmed so that, among other things, it
monitors Jones’s voting behaviour. If Jones were to show any inclination to
vote for McCain (or, let us say, anyone other than Obama), then the computer,
through the chip in Jones’s brain, would intervene to assure that he actually
decides to vote for Obama and does so vote. But if Jones decides on his own to
vote for Obama (as Black, the old progressive would prefer), the computer
does nothing but continue to monitor—without affecting—the goings-on in
Jones’s head. Now suppose that Jones decides to vote for Obama on his own,
just as he would have if Black had not inserted the chip in his head. It seems,
upon first thinking about this case, that Jones can be held morally responsible
for his choice and act of voting for Obama, although he could not have chosen
otherwise and he could not have done otherwise.7
Let Jones vote by pressing a button labelled ‘M’ (McCain) or a button labelled ‘O’
(Obama). Let Black’s chip work by detecting a necessary but not sufficient
precursor of Jones’s being about to choose to press ‘M’.8 Black’s readiness to act on
this necessary condition is meant to ensure not only that Jones could not have voted
for McCain but also that he could not have chosen to vote for McCain. If Jones is
still morally responsible, that rules out not only PAP but also any variant of it that
5 McKenna (2008): 774.
6 Otsuka (1998).
7 Fischer (2010): 316. For another ‘prior sign’ case see e.g. (Sartorio 2016: 13).
8 Black’s oversight of a necessary but not sufficient condition is typical of Frankfurt cases. See (Levy
2008: 225).
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ties moral responsibility for an act to the possibility of choosing or trying to act
otherwise.
The base case is a ‘prior sign’ Frankfurt case. But its bearing on PAP is
irrelevant. It won’t matter to my main argument whether Jones is morally
responsible for what he does (although I shall revisit that point in Section 10). What
matters is that Jones could not have chosen or done otherwise.
2. Start with a version of Fischer’s example—call it F1. Jones’s brain-state’s
instantiating some neurological pattern N* is a necessary but not sufficient condition
of Jones’s being about to decide (say, in the next seven seconds) to press ‘M’. Black
has secretly implanted into Jones’s brain a chip that detects N*. If it does, it warns
Black, who immediately intervenes through the chip to ensure that Jones chooses to
vote for Obama (and does vote for Obama). As it happens, the chip never alerts
Black, who never interferes, and Jones votes for Obama as he intended all along.
Grant the following:
(1) In F1 Jones lacks any opportunity to vote for McCain.
(1) is the antecedent of the target conditional: If Jones lacks opportunities to act
otherwise in this case, then there is a Newcomb Problem for which the opportunity
defence fails. So I may suppose (1) true without argument. Still, conditionals with
wildly implausible antecedents have little interest, so I should motivate (1).
The intuition is that it suffices for foreclosure of an opportunity, that one’s choice
be subject to the wrong kind of external control. It is hard to say precisely what
counts as the ‘wrong kind’. Intuitively, persuading you not to buy something
doesn’t count as denying you the opportunity to buy it. Nor does modestly raising its
price. But neurosurgical intervention counts, as does a steep enough increase in
price—like pointing a gun at your head. Still, it seems plausibly sufficient for
Black’s having denied Jones the opportunity to vote for McCain that Black is
intentionally and systematically ‘linking conditions so that all the conditions that are
necessary for the opportunity to be acted upon are never jointly satisfied’.9 That
does look like the wrong kind of external control.
In F1 the following conditions are nomologically necessary for Jones’s voting for
McCain: (i) Jones’s brain-state instantiates N*; (ii) Jones doesn’t choose to vote for
Obama. In F1 Black is systematically linking (i) and (ii) so that they are never
jointly satisfied. If the chip detects that (i) is true then Black makes (ii) false. Black
has therefore denied Jones the opportunity to vote for McCain in F1. So (1) is true.
Next consider case F2: the chip only monitors Jones. It alerts Black if Jones’s
brain-state instantiates N*. But Black can’t influence Jones via the chip or
otherwise. I claim:
(2) In F2 Jones has an opportunity to vote for McCain.
Mere recording of Jones’s brain-state, which is all that either does or could happen
here, leaves his opportunities just as they would have been if neither Black nor the
chip had been there. But if neither Black nor the chip had been there then Jones
9 Dennett (2015): 129.
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would have had an opportunity to vote for McCain, if anyone ever has an
opportunity to do something that she does not actually do. So (2) is true.10
3. To summarize where we are: so far, I have introduced a ‘prior sign’ Frankfurt
case (F1), and a variant case (F2) where Black is observing but not controlling the
subject. The next case modifies F1 by changing the locus of Black’s control: instead
of being able to manipulate his choice, Black can only manipulate the effect of his
choice. I’ll argue that a comparison with F1 reveals that Jones lacks certain
opportunities, but a comparison with F2 reveals that he now has certain others.
In F3 then, Black can intervene. But if the chip detects N* then Black interferes
not with Jones but with the voting machine. He remotely alters its program so that
pressing either button records a vote for Obama. As before, Jones votes for Obama
without interference, because his brain-state never instantiates N*, and Black never
intervenes.
If (1) and (2) are true then so are:
(3) In F3 Jones lacks any opportunity to vote (i.e. to record a vote) for
McCain.
(4) In F3 Jones has an opportunity to press ‘M’.
My case for (3) is that F3 shares with F1 those features that make (1) true: Black is
controlling Jones’s environment so as to prevent joint realization of all the necessary
conditions for Jones’s voting for McCain. These necessary conditions include:
(i) Jones’s brain-state instantiates N*; (ii) the machine is running normally. If the
chip detects that (i) is true then Black makes (ii) false. Black is intentionally and
systematically preventing it from being the case that Jones votes for McCain. So (3)
is true.
The case for (4) is that F3 shares with F2 those features that make (2) true. What
makes it true in F2 that Jones can vote for McCain is that no external agent is
stopping him. In F2, the chip only records N*. Black does nothing to influence
Jones’s subsequent vote. Equally in F3, if the chip records N*, Black does nothing
to prevent Jones from pressing ‘M’. He intervenes if at all only on the causal
connection between the pressing of ‘M’ and the subsequent recording of a vote. If
anyone ever has an opportunity to do anything that she doesn’t actually do, then
Jones has an opportunity in F3 to press ‘M’. So (4) is true.
4. So far, I have argued that a comparison with F2 and the base case shows that
Jones has certain opportunities in F3 and lacks certain others. I’ll now modify F3,
but not in a way that makes any structural difference to Jones’s opportunities. All
that changes are the possible outcomes. The result is a Newcomb Problem.
This fourth case, F4, resembles F3 except that the machine doesn’t record votes
but transfers money. Jones chooses whether to press ‘M’ or ‘O’. As things are
initially set up, pressing ‘M’ has no effect. But pressing ‘O’ transfers $1000 to
Jones’s account. As before, a necessary condition of Jones’s being about to choose
to press ‘M’ is that his brain-state instantiates N*.
10 Incompatibilists will say that if determinism is true then (2) fails: nobody ever has an opportunity to do
otherwise. But none of the cases that I discuss require determinism: see Section 7.
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Again, a chip in Jones’s brain can reliably detect N*. But this time Black’s
overriding intention is to reward restraint. More particularly, he wants to award
$1 M to anyone who presses ‘M’. So if the chip detects N*, Black remotely
reprograms the machine so that Jones’s pressing either button causes $1 M to be
wired to Jones’s account, on top of the possible $1000 that Jones stands to gain by
pressing ‘O’. Finally, we suppose that in F4 Jones knows about Black’s powers and
intentions.
As it happens, Black doesn’t act. Jones presses ‘O’. His brain-state never
instantiates N*. He ends up $1000 richer.
It is as true in F4 as in F3 that Black is systematically controlling Jones’s
environment to prevent the joint realization of the necessary conditions for
something: not for Jones’s voting for McCain, but for his realizing any outcome in
which he presses ‘M’ and does not get $1 M. Jones’s knowing that and how Black is
controlling his situation has no tendency to diminish this control. Nor does it give
Black control over Jones’s choice between pressing ‘M’ and pressing ‘O’.
Claim: if (3) and (4) are true then so are:
(5) In F4 Jones lacks any opportunity to: press ‘M’ and not make $1 M.
(6) In F4 Jones has an opportunity to press ‘M’.
The case for (5) is that F4 shares with F3 those features that make (3) true in F3.
Two necessary conditions for the realization of this conjunction (i.e. Jones presses
‘M’ and does not make $1 M) are: (i) Jones’s brain-state at some point instantiates
N*; (ii) the machine is running normally. If the chip detects that (i) is true, Black
makes (ii) false. Jones therefore lacks any opportunity to: press ‘M’ and not make a
million. F4 is a Frankfurt case where Black is determined that anyone who presses
‘M’ is rewarded: and to get his way, he is prepared to act to ensure that Jones does
not both press ‘M’ and miss out on the big prize. So (5) is true.
The case for (6) is that F4 shares with F3 those features that make (4) true in F3.
As in F3, if the chip detects N*, Black does nothing to stop Jones from pressing ‘M’.
Jones has an opportunity to press ‘M’ if anyone ever has an opportunity to do
anything that she doesn’t do. So (6) is true.
5. F4 is a Newcomb Problem where pressing ‘M’ corresponds to one-boxing and
pressing ‘O’ corresponds to two-boxing. The payoffs in F4 are as follows (Table 2):
In F4 Jones chooses the two-boxing option (i.e. he presses ‘O’).
In F4, pressing ‘O’ dominates. If Black has detected N* then Jones gets at least
$1 M. But pressing ‘O’ returns an additional $1000. If Black has not detected N*,
then pressing ‘M’ leaves Jones empty-handed, but pressing ‘O’ returns $1000.
Table 2 Payoffs in F4
S1: Black detects N* S2: Black does not detect N*
o1: press ‘M’ m 0
o2: press ‘O’ mþ k k
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Moreover, whether Black has already detected N* when Jones chooses is causally
independent of Jones’s choice, because it precedes Jones’s choice by about seven
seconds. CDT therefore prefers pressing ‘O’.
But what Jones chooses to do is evidentially relevant to whether Black has
detected N*, given Jones’s evidence when he chooses. Certainly, if Jones chooses to
press ‘M’, Black has detected N*. But if Jones chooses to press ‘O’, it is less than
certain that Black has detected N*, and may be most unlikely according to Jones’s
credences. If Jones thinks that Black detects N* on fewer than 99.9% of occasions
on which the agent presses ‘O’, EDT recommends pressing ‘M’.11
This completes the construction of the advertised Newcomb Problem i.e. F4.
Here as in all Newcomb Problems, it is foreseeable that the average return to ‘one-
boxing’ (pressing ‘M’) exceeds the average return to ‘two-boxing’ (pressing ‘O’).
At any rate this is so if Black detects N* on all occasions on which the agent presses
‘M’ and on fewer than 99.9% of occasions on which the agent presses ‘O’. ‘One-
boxers’, who all make $1 M per trial, can therefore press the WAR objection against
Jones and other ‘two-boxers’, who on average make less, possibly much less, than
$1 M per trial.
6. The next step argues that in this Newcomb Problem the ‘opportunity defence’
is not available. Here is the informal argument. For formalization in a weak modal
logic, see the Appendix.
(5) and (6) imply that Jones has an opportunity to press ‘M’ but not to press ‘M’
without making $1 M. But if Jones can in this sense press ‘M’ but can’t press ‘M’
without making $1 M, then he can get $1 M. Therefore, Jones has an opportunity to
make $1 M. He cannot invoke the opportunity defence.
Or if he does, then he must explain which of (5) or (6) he rejects, and why. (6)
looks unassailable; and I argued that (5) is true if (1) is. Hence my conditional
conclusion: if in Frankfurt cases like F1 Black has deprived Jones of any
opportunity to realize what Black wants to avert, then F4 is a Newcomb case where
the opportunity defence is unavailable.
That concludes the main argument. I turn to three objections.
7. Nothing in these examples presupposes determinism about Jones’s choices, in
the sense that the state of the world at any earlier time nomologically determines
Jones’s choice. It is not true, for instance, that N* nomologically necessitates that
Jones will choose to press ‘M’ in F4, nor that the absence of N* nomologically
necessitates that Jones will choose to press ‘O’. The absence of N* at any time only
necessitates that Jones will not choose to press ‘M’ in the next few seconds; this is
nomologically consistent with his doing so later.
But even that limited determinism, not about Jones’s ultimate choice but about
any choice he makes in a given time window, might seem to threaten (6). The
objection is that when he presses ‘O’ Jones lacks any opportunity to press ‘M’,
because his brain-state was not recently instantiating N*. Nor did he have that
11 EDT strictly prefers pressing ‘M’ iff m[ k þ mCr S1jO2ð Þ i.e. iff Cr S1jO2ð Þ\0:999.
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opportunity earlier if his brain-state never instantiated N*. So Jones can complain
(contrary to (6)) that he never had an opportunity to press ‘M’.12
There are three responses. The most defensive response is that the objection
would only appeal to someone who thinks that any pre-t state of the world, that
nomologically determines that one will not choose an option at t, eliminates any
opportunity to choose that option at t. One might instead think that the only
determining factors that are genuinely opportunity-depriving are those involving
external impediments or external interference by another. On this view, the fact that
your present choice is somehow determined by your past (internal) brain-state
cannot by itself deprive you of any present opportunity to do whatever that brain-
state rules out. Thus (apparently) Dennett, who grants in support of (5) that
Frankfurt-style interference deprives Jones of an opportunity,13 whilst maintain-
ing—in support of (6)—that mere determination-by-the-past does not.
[A] real opportunity is an occasion where a self-controller ‘faces’ (is informed
about) a situation in which the outcome of its subsequent ‘deliberation’ will be
a decisive (as we say) factor. In such a situation more than one outcome is
‘possible’ so far as the agent or self-controller is concerned; that is, the critical
nexus passes through its deliberation. That is what we mean when we say that
the outcome is up to the agent.14
Anyone who agrees with Dennett will accept (5) but reject this objection to (6).
Waiving that, the second point is that even if Jones lacked any opportunity to
press ‘M’ when he chose to press ‘O’, it doesn’t follow that he lacked any
opportunity to press ‘M’. When he pressed ‘O’ he could instead have waited. And
there need have been nothing about the state of his brain or of the world at that time
that was nomologically inconsistent with his pressing ‘M’ later. So even if Jones
lacked any opportunity to press ‘M’ when he chose to press ‘O’, he had an
opportunity to press ‘M’, and he had an opportunity to make $1 M.15
The third, more tentative point is that it may be unnecessary to suppose that the
prior appearance of N* is a necessary condition for Jones to press ‘M’. Suppose
instead that N* is ‘nearly’ necessary: at the outset there is a very high chance p that
his brain-state instantiates N* at some later time, given that he does at some later
time choose to press ‘M’; and that there is a lower chance q\p km that his brain-
state ever instantiates N*, given that he chooses to press ‘O’. If these conditional
chances control the corresponding frequencies then this indeterministic case is a
Newcomb Problem where pressing ‘M’ generates a foreseeably higher average
return than pressing ‘O’. If Jones makes $1 K, can he now plead the opportunity
defence?
12 Cf. Widerker (1995): 251.
13 Dennett (2015): 144–5. Here Dennett is discussing the original type of Frankfurt case, where Black
stands ready to manipulate Jones after observing Jones’s choice. But there is reason to think he would say
the same about the ‘prior sign’ cases under discussion here: see especially p. 129 as quoted in §2.
14 Dennett (2015): 129.
15 Cf. Hunt (2005): 135.
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Clearly (6) still holds, because now Jones’s choice is undetermined by anything
in its past. Everything turns on whether (5) holds i.e. on whether, in this
indeterministic case, Black has deprived Jones of an opportunity to: press ‘M’ and
not make $1 M. Has he? To see why he has, compare these cases.
(a) Black shuts Jones in a room from which the only exit is a door that Black
has secured with a steel padlock, and Jones doesn’t have a key.
(b) Black shuts Jones in a room from which the only exit is a door that Black
has secured with a combination lock with 100 million settings, and Jones
doesn’t know the combination.
Could anyone say with a straight face that Jones has an opportunity to leave the
room in (b) though not in (a)? It may in some sense be possible that Jones leaves in
(b) but not in (a). For instance, it may be that laws of nature plus simple physical
facts rule out Jones’s getting past the padlock in (a), but not his hitting on the right
combination in (b). But this sort of ‘opportunity’ lacks real interest.16 For all
practical purposes, Black has ensured that Jones stays put in (b). For that matter, if
quantum tunnelling is physically possible then it is equally possible in that sense
that Jones leaves in (a).
(6) can therefore tolerate some injection of chanciness into F4. Black can ensure
that Jones does not achieve this or that outcome without making anything physically
impossible. For Black to do that, it suffices that (i) it doesn’t happen because (ii)
Black has made it sufficiently unlikely. But then even in this indeterministic version
of F4, Black has eliminated Jones’s opportunity to get anything other than $1 M by
pressing ‘M’. Since Jones has an opportunity to press ‘M’, it follows that he has an
opportunity to make $1 M, so cannot plead the opportunity defence.
Somebody might object that there is, in this indeterministic version, something
that Jones knows how to do—pressing ‘M’—such that, if he were to do it, then he
would be falsifying the material conditional o1 ! m, at least on a non-back-tracking
reading of ‘If he were to do it…’.17 But then in (b), there is something that he knows
how to do—entering the sequence 01271756—such that, if he were to do it, then he
would be opening the combination lock. If it is consistent with the latter that Black
has locked Jones into the room in (b) then it is consistent with the former that Black
has locked Jones out of falsifying o1 ! m in F4.
For that matter there is, on the non-back-tracking reading, something that Jones
knows how to do in the original Frankfurt case—pressing ‘M’—such that if he were
to do it, he would be voting for McCain. So anyone who takes this line against (5)
must also reject (1). The objection is therefore impotent against the conditional: if
16 Hume’s famous example is another case where we regard an opportunity as having been foreclosed
without regarding its realization as physically impossible. ‘A prisoner who has neither money nor interest,
discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers the obstinacy of the gaoler, as the
walls and bars with which he is surrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work
upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other’ (Hume 1975: 90).
17 A non-back-tracking conditional [ is true iff all the closest worlds at which a is true (the closest ‘a-
worlds’) are b-worlds, where the closest a-worlds (i) match actuality over all particular matters of fact
that are causally independent of whether a is true; and (ii) contain no violations of the actual laws except
possibly for a small, local miracle that shortly precedes and also brings about the realization of a.
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Jones lacks the opportunities that he is supposed to lack in ‘prior sign’ Frankfurt
cases, then the opportunity defence fails for both F4 and this indeterministic version
of it.
A chancy case like this may be feasible. In a recent study, fMRI subjects would
‘fixat[e] on the centre of [a] screen where a stream of letters was presented. At some
point, when they felt the urge to do so, they were to freely decide between one of
two buttons, operated by the left and right index fingers, and press it immediately’.18
Experimenters found that:
two brain regions encoded with high accuracy whether the subject was about
to choose the left or right response prior to the conscious decision… The first
region was in frontopolar cortex, BA10. The predictive information in the
fMRI signals from this brain region was already present 7 s. before the
subject’s motor decision.19
Suppose we find that for almost all subjects who choose to press the left-hand
button, an indication of this is present in the relevant region of BA10 a few seconds
before they choose. Similarly, suppose that for most subjects who choose to press
the right-hand button, an indication of this is present in the same region a few
seconds beforehand. We could arrange things so that pressing the right-hand button
caused the release of $1000 to the subject’s bank account and pressing the left-hand
button caused the termination of the experiment without this reward. Black could
then further arrange to release $1 M to the subject’s bank account as soon as fMRI
detected that the subject would press the left-hand button.20 In this case all subjects
have, but only those who press the left-hand button realize, an opportunity to win
$1 M.
8. A second objection is that F4 is not a Newcomb case at all. A genuine
Newcomb case involves exactly two options: ‘one-boxing’ and ‘two-boxing’. But
F4 offers Jones three options at any time. He can press ‘M’ now; he can press ‘O’
now; and he can wait before choosing.
This makes a difference because CDT seems to recommend waiting. After all,
the effect of waiting can only be to make N* more likely to occur at some time
before Jones chooses what to press. But F4 is a Newcomb case only if CDT
recommends pressing ‘O’.
But even if CDT sometimes recommends waiting, this doesn’t help CDT.
Whether or not F4 is strictly a Newcomb case, followers of CDT will wait either
forever (and never win anything) or until the marginal costs of waiting exceed the
marginal benefits of increasing the probability that N* is at some point realized in
their brains, and at that point press ‘O’ and end up with $1000. In either case those
18 Soon et al. (2008): 543.
19 Soon et al. (2008): 544.
20 The $1 M reward would not be immediate: given current constraints, the time required to determine
that activity in BA10 was symptomatic of impending left-button-pressing exceeds the time-lapse between
that activity and the subject’s choice. But it is still a Newcomb case. Even if the reward is subsequent to
the choice it is still causally independent of the choice, because it depends only on activity that strictly
preceded the choice.
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agents end up worse than followers of EDT, and in either case they can’t complain
that they lacked the opportunity to win $1 M.
Besides, it isn’t clear that CDT does recommend waiting. If (as we might
suppose) N* only ever occurs within a fixed time interval preceding the subject’s
choice, there is no reason to expect waiting to increase the probability that N*
precedes whatever choice the subject ultimately makes. Compare: my space capsule
only deploys a parachute when it is a minute away from landing. Waiting before
starting my descent (rather than descending immediately) doesn’t make it more
likely that the parachute is deployed at some time before landing.
But if CDT doesn’t recommend waiting (and of course neither does EDT) then
the only plausible options at any time are pressing ‘M’ and pressing ‘O’, so F4 is
after all a Newcomb case.
9. The third objection involves a notion of opportunity that falsifies (5).
C-opportunity: At any time:
(i) You have a counterfactual opportunity (a C-opportunity) to realize the
truth of a proposition p by choosing o iff o is an option at that time such
that if you had at that time realized o, then p would have been true.21
(ii) You have a C-opportunity to u by choosing o iff you have a C-
opportunity to realize the truth of the proposition that you u by choosing
o.
(iii) You have a C-opportunity to u iff one of your options is such that you
have a C-opportunity to u by choosing it.
Crucially, the counterfactual in (i) is a non-back-tracking conditional [ : a[ b is
true iff all of the closest possible worlds at which a is true (the closest ‘a-worlds’)
are b-worlds, where the closest a-worlds (i) match the actual world over all
particular matters of fact that are causally independent of whether a is true; and (ii)
contain no violations of the actual laws except possibly for a small, local miracle
that very shortly precedes and also brings about the realization of a.22
On this definition of opportunity, (5) is false when Jones chooses to press ‘O’. At
that time, he has the option to press ‘M’. And if—in the non-back-tracking sense—
Jones had then pressed ‘M’, it would have been true that: he presses ‘M’ and fails to
21 For present purposes I treat an option as a proposition that the agent can make true if she pleases
(Jeffrey 1983: 84), i.e. one that would be true if the agent were to choose to make it true, where this
counterfactual has a non-back-tracking sense. One problem with this proposal as a general definition is
that a proposition’s being an option in this sense is neither necessary nor sufficient for the agent to have
the ability to realize it, since abilities are dispositions that can be masked or finked through external
interference (Vihvelin 2004: 437 ff.). But that makes no difference to the cases under consideration,
where Black does not, and is not disposed to, interfere with the causal connection between Jones’s choice
and any of his options.
22 For present purposes, this analysis of the non-backtracking counterfactual is equivalent to Lewis’s
(1979a, b) theory, though like Edgington’s improvement upon it (Edgington 2004), it relies explicitly on
the notion of causal independence. The analysis implies that we have a very wide range of counterfactual
opportunities. For instance (and as Lewis notes), if determinism is true then we have abundant
C-opportunities to realize the truth of the proposition that a law of nature is broken (Lewis 1981b).
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make $1 M. Jones therefore has a C-opportunity to press ‘M’ and fail to make
$1 M.
Similarly, if opportunities are just C-opportunities then Jones lacks any
opportunity to make $1 M. This is because when he chooses, Black has not
detected N* and has not transferred $1 M to Jones’s account. These facts are
causally independent of what Jones chooses. So if—in the non-back-tracking
sense—Jones had chosen either option, it would not have been the case that he made
$1 M. Jones therefore lacks a C-opportunity to make $1 M.23
I concede that if opportunities are C-opportunities then (5) is false. But I deny
that this undermines the argument. I defended the material conditional: if Jones
lacks an opportunity to defy Black in a Frankfurt case like F1, then he has an
opportunity to make $1 M in a Newcomb case like F4. If opportunities are
C-opportunities then the consequent of this conditional is false, but so is its
antecedent. The conditional is still true.
The antecedent is false in F1 because the implant has not detected N* when Jones
chooses to vote for Obama. So Black is not intervening. This fact is causally
independent of Jones’s choice. So at the closest worlds at which Jones chooses to
vote for McCain, Black is not intervening. At these worlds Jones presses ‘M’ and
votes for McCain. So Jones has a C-opportunity to vote for McCain. Anyone who
thinks that opportunities are C-opportunities should deny that Black eliminates them
in ‘prior sign’ Frankfurt cases.24 But this is no objection to the conditional defended
here: if Jones lacks an opportunity to defy Black in a Frankfurt case like F1, then he
has an opportunity to make m in a Newcomb case like F4.25
10. The next step in this dialectic – which I cannot pursue at length – turns on a
question that this conditional raises. We saw two kinds of opportunity in play:
C-opportunity, and the kind of opportunity that Black’s presence, intentions and
23 Supposing that Jones has an option of waiting doesn’t change this: it is not true that if he had waited
then his brain-state would at some later point instantiated N* (see Section 8—although perhaps if he had
waited then his brain-state might have instantiated N*: that is, if o3 is the proposition that he waits at the
time that he actually chooses to press ‘O’, and n is the proposition that his brain-state instantiates N* at
some later time, then perhaps  o3 [  nð Þ.) So neither is it true that if he had waited then he would
have had a C-opportunity to make $1 M. Besides, if Jones did have a C-opportunity to make $1 M in F4
then that only helps WAR.
24 Cf. Smith (2004): 100 ff. For illuminating further discussion, see (Whittle 2010: 12 ff).
25 Another reason to care about the difference, between C-opportunities and those being denied in
Frankfurt cases, arises from Pettit’s distinction between Liberal and Republican concepts of negative
liberty. I am free in the Liberal sense to the extent that others don’t interfere with me. I am free in the
Republican sense to the extent that this non-interference is resilient i.e. not down to the whim of any non-
interfering other—she could not have interfered had she so chosen (Pettit 1993: 24–8). For instance,
suppose I live in a state where it is common knowledge that all crimes are detected and severely punished;
but my neighbour owns a gun. This state is depriving my neighbour of a ‘Frankfurtian’ opportunity to
shoot me. After all, one necessary condition of my neighbour’s shooting me is that he chooses to shoot
me, and the state is preventing him from choosing to shoot me by maintaining and advertising its forensic
and penal capacities. But it isn’t depriving him of a C-opportunity to shoot me, because nothing is
preventing him from shooting me if he chooses. This state preserves my freedom in the Liberal sense but
not in the Republican sense.
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capacities are denying to Jones in the Frankfurt cases—call it ‘F-opportunity’.26 The
question is whether lack of C-opportunity to do better is by itself sufficient for
exculpation. If so, then Jones cannot be blamed for making only $1000, because he
lacks any C-opportunity to make more. On the other hand, if lack of C-opportunity
is insufficient, then the opportunity defence is at best incomplete, because as we
saw, it appeals only to Jones’s lack of C-opportunity, not to any lack of
F-opportunity.
One prima facie basis for thinking that lack of C-opportunity cannot by itself be
exculpatory arises from reflection on something like the original Frankfurt case (not
the ‘prior sign’ cases). Suppose that Black plans to wait until Jones has decided
what to do, and then if necessary—if he has decided to vote for McCain—to coerce
or force him into voting for Obama. Jones then lacks any C-opportunity to vote for
McCain, but he is still responsible for voting for Obama if he does it
wholeheartedly. Similarly, we might suspect that someone who autonomously
chooses to exercise, and does exercise, the ‘two-boxing’ option in the Newcomb
Problem is responsible for his (relative) impoverishment. (Of course this is at best a
sketch of an argument).27
It might also help to examine moral Newcomb Problems: cases like F4 where the
payoffs carry moral significance. The literature hasn’t covered these extensively, but
one notable recent treatment is due to MacAskill, who offers the following:
Box A is opaque; Box B, transparent. If the Predictor predicts that you choose
Box A only, then he puts one wish into Box A. With that wish, you would save
the lives of one million terminally ill children. If he predicts that you choose
both Box A and Box B, then he will put nothing into Box A. Box B—
transparent to you—contains a stick of gum. You have two options only:
Choose Box A, or choose both Box A and Box B.28
I am inclined to agree with MacAskill’s own intuition in favour of one-boxing here;
more to the present point, it seems reasonable to blame any two-boxer for betting
with other people’s lives that he could outwit the predictor. (‘But when I chose to
two-box I couldn’t have saved them!’—‘But in the sense in which you couldn’t
outwit the predictor, you could have saved them.’) If so, the lack of any
C-opportunity to do better than one actually did cannot in general be exculpatory.
26 One way to cash out the distinction is in terms of the interpretation of counterfactuals. If, in the
definition of C-opportunity, we read the counterfactual in (i) as non-backtracking, we get the intended
reading. But if we read it as suitably backtracking, in the manner of Horgan (1981), we may get a parallel
notion of F-opportunity. For a recent discussion connecting the EDT/CDT dispute and the interpretation
of counterfactuals, see (Price and Liu 2018 §2.3). (Of course the conditional that the main part of this
essay defends is true on a uniform application of either interpretation).
27 It might matter, for instance, that in the standard Frankfurt case Jones doesn’t know that he lacks a
C-opportunity to do otherwise, whereas in the Newcomb Problem he may know that he lacks a
C-opportunity to make $1 M. But if the predictor is imperfect (but still very good) in the Newcomb
Problem then he doesn’t know this; nor does he know it if he hasn’t yet decided what to do. Obviously the
matter invites further investigation.
28 MacAskill (2016): 429.
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Obviously there is more to be said about the interplay of ethical, decision-
theoretic and forensic reasoning that this case involves, and also about whether the
conditional that this essay defends serves better as the major premise of a modus
ponens or as the major premise of a modus tollens (if either). Still, the conditional
itself is true: whatever kind of opportunity is being foreclosed in the Frankfurt cases
is not being denied to two-boxers like Jones in the Newcomb case that we studied.
And I hope that it gets us closer to resolving at least one of the two long-standing
philosophical problems that it connects.
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Appendix
This appendix argues formally for the claim in Section 5 that Jones has an
opportunity to make $1 M in F4.
I assume two schematic principles of the logic of opportunity ascriptions. For any
proposition p, write rp to mean that Jones has an opportunity to realize an outcome
in which p holds. Write Dp ¼def: r p for its dual: Dp means that Jones lacks
any opportunity to avoid an outcome in which p holds. I’ll assume that any instances
of the following schemata are true if t is replaced by any tautology and p and q by
any propositions.
(7) Dt
(8) D p ! qð Þ ! Dp ! Dqð Þ
These are theorems of the weakest modal logic K.29 In English, (7) says that Jones
cannot falsify a tautology and (8) says that if Jones cannot achieve p without q, and
cannot avoid p, then he cannot avoid q.30
Now if every instance of (7) and (8) is true then so is every instance of:
29 The axioms of K are (a) all tautologies (b) every instance of (8). The rules are modus ponens and
necessitation: if p is a theorem then so is Dp.
30 (8) resembles van Inwagen’s beta, which says that from Np and N p ! qð Þ we may infer Nq, where Np
says that p is true and nobody had any choice about it (van Inwagen 1983: 94). One objection to beta is
that it entails agglomeration: Np&Nqð Þ ! N p&qð Þ, which is false. For a counterexample (McKay and
Johnson 1996: 115-6), suppose this coin was not tossed, so (p) it didn’t land heads and (q) it didn’t land
tails. Nobody had a choice about whether it landed heads or about whether it landed tails, so Np&Nq, but
somebody did have a choice about whether it was tossed, so N p&qð Þ.
Could one similarly object to (8)? No: although (8) implies an agglomeration principle
Dp&Dqð Þ ! D p&qð Þ, the counterexample is less telling. Consider a coin that Jones did not toss but
might have tossed. It seems that Jones had an opportunity to achieve an outcome in which it landed heads,
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(9) D p ! qð Þ ! rp ! rqð Þ
This says that if Jones cannot achieve p without q, but can achieve p, then he can
achieve q. Proof: any instance of D p ! qð Þ !  q !  pð Þð Þ is an instance of (7).
By an instance of (8), it follows that D p ! qð Þ ! D  q !  pð Þ and by another
instance of (8) that D p ! qð Þ ! D q ! D pð Þ. The latter is logically equivalent
to D p ! qð Þ ! D p ! D qð Þ. From this, it follows by the definition of D
and the interchange of logical equivalents licensed by (7) and (8) that
D p ! qð Þ ! rp ! rqð Þ.
(5) and (6) say respectively that Jones cannot press ‘M’ without getting $1 M and
that he can press ‘M’. In formal terms, and writing m for the proposition that Jones
gets $1 M:
(10) D o1 ! mð Þ
Footnote 30 continued
and so an outcome in which p fails, just as anyone who can buy a ticket in a fair lottery has an opportunity
to win it. So Dp&Dqð Þ ! D p&qð Þ is true because its antecedent is false.
More generally, it seems plausible that for some closeness relation m on possible worlds, we have:
Dq $ 8p rp ! p[ mqð Þð Þ, where ‘p[ q’ is true if and only some p&qð Þ world is m-closer to actuality
than any ðp& qÞ-world: that is, p is inevitable for Jones iff it would be true whichever of his
opportunities he were to realize. Then whatever the m turns out to be, (8) is also true. Informal proof: for
any m, if p ! q is true at all m-closest o-worlds for any opportunity o, and if p is true at all m-closest o-
worlds for any opportunity o, then q is true at all m-closest o-worlds for any opportunity o. The analogous
principle for N would be Nq $ 8p Mp ! p[ mqð Þð Þ, writing ‘M’ for the dual of N. This principle seems
false for any reading of ‘[ m’ on which it is false that: if Jones had tossed this coin it would not have
landed tails.
Objection: I said in Section 7 that Jones lacks any opportunity to enter the right combination into a
combination lock. What is the difference between (i) buying a ticket in a fair lottery and (ii) entering some
number into a combination lock, such that my having an opportunity to do (i) gives me an opportunity to
win, but Jones’s having an opportunity to do (ii) does not give him an opportunity to leave the room?
Reply: getting the right combination is, and buying a winning lottery ticket isn’t, quasi-miraculous in
the sense of suggesting some conspiracy (Lewis 1986: 58 ff.). In a big lottery, the fact that my ticket is the
winner has little tendency to suggest a conspiracy; whereas Jones’s getting the combination right—or a
monkey’s spontaneously typing a 950-page dissertation on anti-realism—though perhaps no more
unlikely, is evidence of collusion or similar.
If Jones had been one of millions of prisoners in the same situation, or if the monkey had been one of
very many monkeys in the same situation, then it would have been different. If Jones is the only prisoner
then the prior probability of (cj) there being a conspiracy involving Jones is relatively high, so (rj) Jones’s
getting the right combination raises this probability to a high level. But if Jones is one of many prisoners
then the prior probability of a conspiracy involving Jones in particular is relatively low, so the posterior
probability of a conspiracy involving Jones is also low, although the Bayes factor Pr rjjcj
 
Pr rjj  cj
 
is
the same.
There are arguments that we should not put the difference between (i) and (ii) in terms of quasi-
miracles but rather in terms of the mathematically more sophisticated notion of typicality (Williams 2008:
406 ff.; Elga 2004: 71; Gaifman and Snir 1982: 544). However, typicality supports the distinction equally
well. Jones’s buying a winning ticket in a lottery, or tossing a fair coin which then lands heads, are both
typical in the relevant sense, but his hitting on the right combination is not typical.
Note finally that the avoidance of quasi-miracles or of atypicality should also figure in whatever
closeness measure m witnesses the counterfactual constraint Dq $ 8p rp ! p[ mqð Þð Þ. That means that
if Jones lacks an opportunity to leave in (b), then since Jones has the opportunity to enter some
combination or other, the m-closest worlds at which he enters some combination or other are worlds at
which he does not enter the right combination. This is no objection to the constraint: it just reveals a
conceptual connection between quasi-miracles or typicality and opportunities.
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(11) ro1
But it follows from an instance of (9) together with (10) and (11) that rm i.e. Jones
does have an opportunity to make $1 M.
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